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ILLEGITIMACY UNDER THE
CHILDREN'S CODE*

T

HE 1929 session of the Wisconsin legislature 'has seen the necessity for the more adequate protection of illegitimate children. This
advantageous step was taken to increase the humanness of the law
already enacted on this subject. These laws are embodied in Chapter
166 R. S.
A study of the amendments to Chapter 166 R. S. included in Chapter
439, Laws of 1929, commonly known as the Children's Code manifests
an effort to more effectually secure the purposes above indicated. Although much study and thought has been given in the last decade to the
social problem herein treated there have been no substantial changes
in the law since the enactment of the original statutes as it appears in the
statutes of 1849.
The belief that the purposes of Chapter 166 were merely disguised
poor relief and that the sole intent of the law was to "keep -the child off
the county" was firmly entrenched in the minds of most attorneys. That
the primary purposes of the law were never fully realized 'by many of
the legal profession, including those upon whom the responsibility for
its administration ifell is plainly evident. There can be no misunderstanding of its present intent.
The new law materially increases the responsibilities of the district
attorneys of the state, giving them broad powers and exacting duties.
Its proper administration necessitates not only legal knowledge but also
an understanding of the exceedingly complicated social problem of
illegitimacy.
That these matters will take more of their time than ever before is
apparent. That Sec. 48.45 (2) compelling all maternity hospitals to
report illegitimate births to the state board of control within twentyfour hours and the additional duty of the state board of control; subsection 12 of See. 8, -to see that appropriate steps are taken to establish
paternity and secure for the child the nearest possible approximation
to the care, support, and education that the child would be entitled to had
it been born in lawful wedlock, will materially increase the number of
cases, is to be expected. The necessity for the appearance of the district attorney at preliminary hearings,1 the drafting of settlement agree* By J. J. Kenney; past district attorney and divorce counsel of Milwaukee
County, present probation officer.

'Wis. Statutes, Sec. 166.08.
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ments and the presentation of the same to the court for approval, 2

Will

cause more of his time to be devoted to this class of cases.
That larger settlements will be received, and fewer agreements containing denials of paternity made, is but a natural consequence of the
district attorneys' realization that in illegitimacy proceedings they are
appearing primarily in the interests of the child rather than as attorneys
for the county seeking settlements sufficient only to keep the child "off
the county" until it could .be placed by either the mother or the countyAttempts by mothers of illegitimate children to release them through
the juvenile courts 3 of the larger counties will result in the matters
being referred back to the district attorney of the mother's county in
order that he may take proper proceedings in the interest of the child.
To justify this increased labor and to reassure district attorneys that
it will result in actual benefit to the child let us look at Sec. 166.11 and
166.18. There we find the child protected from the misuse of funds
supposedly set aside for -its benefit. This section also prevents blackmailing by limiting the rights of the mothers solely to that part of the
proceeds paid for the lying-in expenses and-the support of the child up to
the time of the entry of judgment or agreement, the money paid for
the future support of the child being distributed by a trustee under direction of the court.
The intent of any law may be the highest and the results sought desirable and still entirely fail unless the procedure -therein provided be
practicable. Excepting in the matter of agreements there has been no
substantial change in the procedure; slight modifications being made
so that the new law agrees in substance with the Uniform Illegitimacy
Act, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws and still retaining the satisfactory features of the earlier
Wisconsin law.
Some of the new provisions are: the issuance of summons instead
of a warrant upon consent of -the complainant.4 This calls for the use
of discretion upon the part of the district attorney. There are many
-instances where the initial proceeding by warrant with its subsequent
arrest and confinement has 'had a bad psychological effect upon the
putative father, preventing, or making it difficult to arrive at an amicable settlement, arousing the hate and animosity of the father toward the
child and bringing about ill-advised unsocial marriages which soon arrived in our already overcrowded divorce courts.
2 Sec.

166.07.

'Sec. 48.07, and 48.08.
'Wis. Statutes, Sec. 166.01.
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At both the preliminary hearing before the magistrate,' and at the
time of trial6 the general public may be excluded.
The Tight of trial by jury belongs to either party, but unless it is
7
demanded, trial shall be before the court.
Judgments determining paternity shall be filed by the clerk of courts
with the state registrar of vital statistics.8
Provision is made for the judgment to include funeral expense in the
event of the child's death before trial.9 Authority is also given to commence the action even though the child is dead at the time of birth.'"
Under either circumstances the judgment would be the same as in other
cases except that no provision would be made for the future support of
the child.
The failure of the defendant to give satisfactory bond after entry
of judgment will not necessarily result in his confinement," it being
discretionary with the court to stay execution of the commitment until
there has been a default. This enables the court to place the defendant
upon a probationary basis and makes unnecessary the acceptance of the
"defendant's own bond." The apparent leniency of this provision toward the defendant is more than offset by the additional security given
the interests of the child and the mother by Sec. 166.12 and Sec. 166.14.
Criminal action under Sec. 151.30 still remains.
When the child is liable to become a county charge and the mother
fails to complain, if the district attorney believes it to be to the best
interests of the child, he shall institute proceedings under 166.20, and
where the mother commences a proceeding and fails to prosecute the
same the district attorney has the power to make an agrement with the
putative father in the same manner as might be made by the mother. 1 '
While the district attorney must prepare all agreements under this law,"
he, himself, is one of the contracting parties under Sec. 166.22.
Believing that opportunity should be given for the parties to voluntarily assume their obligations toward the unfortunate child in a manner
that will fully protect its interests, settlement agreements are provided
for and encouraged.' 4 The agreement may be made at any time before
final judgment. It must be approve4 by the trial court. The parties
Sec. 166.02.

Sec. 166.10.
Wis. Statutes, Sec. 166.10.
'Sec. 166.11.
'Sec. 166.11.
10 Sec. 166.01.
Sec. 166.13.
Sec. 166.22.
Sec. 166.08.
Wis. Statutes, Sec. 166.07.
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must submit personally to the jurisdiction of the court. The parties
mutst be in agreement upon all matters upon which the court is to pass
judgment except that of the paternity of the child. If the court approves
of an agreement between the parties without an admission of paternity
it shall be ordered filed, and upon a default of any of the terms the
court will order judgment. Where the defendant has admitted paternity
judgment shall be ordered at once upon approval -by the court of the
other terms of the agreement. These records, together with all other
records of court proceedings in these matters shall not be open to the
inspection of anyone but the parties.' 5
The amendments to Chapter 166 of the statutes apply to proceedings
commenced after the act took effect.
The purpose of these statutes can best be outlined by quoting the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ffranken v. State, 190 Wis. 424, in which
the question of the purpose of similar statutes was considered. It said:
What then, did the legislature have in mind when it enacted these
statutes? What purpose did it intend to serve in the interests of the
public; and what protection did it contemplate for those involved in such
a proceeding; and upon whom did it design the placing of any burdens?
In the first place, it singled out from the children of the state, who are
its wards, illegitimate children, and placed them in a separate class, for
it needs no argument to realize -thatsuch children, owing to the peculiar
situation surrounding them, must be afforded special protection, not only
that the child may be afforded nurture, education, and support, but that
it may be raised under such circumstances as will constitute it at maturity
a useful citizen of the state. It is therefore the prospective birth of
an illegitimate child, and its welfare after birth, that have been instrumental in moving the legislature to action, and a careful examination of
these statutes will reveal that the primary object of the legislature was
to secure the protection and 'velfare of the child. When it comes to
protective legislation of this kind, it is meet and proper that the innocent
should receive primary attention.

" Sec. 166.17.

